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SENIORITY PROVISIONS IN LABOR CONTRACTS
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OWEN FAIRWEATHER
HE law concerns itself with rights of individuals, or synthetic in-
dividuals like corporations, relative to each other or to the state.
A labor agreement establishes relative rights among employees
and between employees, unions and the company. It is, therefore, a
legal instrument and the rights established in that instrument are
becoming of greater social importance every day.
When the substantive provisions of a labor agreement are deter-
mined, not by agreement between the parties, but by recommenda-
tions of a public quasi-judical tribunal, the process of establishing the
relative rights, and the relative rights themselves, are of greater concern
to the law, to lawyers and to the public generally. If erroneous princi-
ples are employed in this process, erroneous patterns and precedents
may be established which are hard to change. It is wiser to employ
sound principles in the first instance than to "muddle through" and
then face the problem of correction later.
The Wage Stabilization Board's dispute powers represent the cur-
rent form of intervention by the state into the process of establishing
relative rights in labor agreements. Important questions involving the
"seniority rights" aspects of a labor agreement have come before that
tribunal and additional problems may be presented to it or to similar
boards. It is important to reconsider the social and economic con-
sequences of further extensions of the "seniority" principle. Seniority
systems are becoming universal, and rather than being a mere provision
in a labor agreement, seniority systems should be considered as social
institutions and the advantages and disadvantages of changes in these
systems should be analyzed from this point of view.'
I The Wage Stabilization Board has recently made recommendations in a dispute
between the United Steelworkers of America and various steel and iron ore com-
panies. One of the issues before the Board concerned the Union's demands to change
certain basic "seniority" concepts. This article considers the problems involved from a
MR. FAIRWEATHER is a member of the Chicago firm of Seyfartb, Shaw and Fair-
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ment.
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The demands of unions to change seniority provisions and practices
are often classified as non-economic demands. This classification seems
inaccurate because seniority practices directly affect the ability and
capacity of industry to absorb the cost increases and to grow. Indus-
trial growth in part depends upon (i) the rate that new and better
equipment is made available by technological research and capital in-
vestments, and (z) the efficiency with which workers operate this
machinery and equipment. This article deals with practices which di-
rectly affect the second of these two factors.
In many major industries "seniority rights" provisions of a labor
agreement establish tests and principles of application which are used to
select employees for jobs, determine under what circumstances senior-
ity is to be applied, and from what group or unit the individuals are to
be selected. In this sense "seniority rights" represent a composite of the
tests used and their method of application in a system of choice. Ac-
cordingly the term "seniority rights" as used herein should not be con-
fused with the term "seniority" as it is used in the railroad industry
where length of continuous service is the primary test in the system
of choice.
The first important principle in the seniority systems in many indus-
tries, notably the steel industry, is that the primary test for selection is
the relative ability and physical fitness of an employee to perform the
job efficiently and after that is determined length of continuous service
is used as the test.
The second important principle of most seniority systems is that the
system should not be so rigid that plant operations are seriously affected.
Flexibility in the application of the system is preserved by allowing
management the right to make the initial determinations and providing
that the tests do not apply to all job transfers.'
Unions often urge in those industries which have seniority systems
based on the two principles mentioned above, that a more rigid and in-
flexible system be established. Typical of the rigid type of system is the
general point of view, but many of the examples cited and arbitration awards referred
to concern the steel industry. This results from the fact that much of the material con-
tained in the article was developed in connection with that proceeding.
2 "Between a reasonable, flexible use of seniority-'other things being equal'-and a
rigid, written exclusive reliance on length of service in layoffs and rehirings lies the
difference. The issue is between the proper use of a sound principle and its application
in a way ultimately oppressive and hurtful not only to management but also to labor
and to the public." Feldman, Stabilizing Jobs and Wages 207 (1940).
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seniority system in the railroad industry.' It is necessary, therefore, to
summarize the typical reasons for union objection to flexible seniority
systems which employ the relative ability standard.
Unions desire to substitute length of service as the sole criterion
because such a criterion is impersonal. It is impersonal because it ignores
all consideration of the relative merit of individuals and depends only
on length of service. This method of selection is easily "sold" to the
mediocre and the unambitious worker who objects to promotion on the
basis of merit "because the use of merit as the basis for a promotion will
help the superior few at the expense of the mediocre many.' 4
Union objection to a system of choice which contains the relative
ability test may also stem from the fact that such a system is more diffi-
cult to administer and may lead to controversy between employees
which could involve the union leaders. Informed observers point out
that unions are mistaken because the use of the arbitrary length of
service tests produces even greater problems between employees.5
In addition, unions have argued that where the ability of the em-
ployee is to be determined there exists the possibility that the choice
may be influenced by either friendship for, or dislike toward, an
employee. By using length of service as the sole criterion these influ-
ences, which are difficult to detect and prove, would be eliminated.
The mere possibility of such an influence is hardly a reason for aban-
doning a system which is correct in principle.
The use of an impersonal system which denies to the individual a
right of advancement on his own merits may consciously or uncon-
sciously be urged by unions because it forces individuals to attempt to
raise their status by group action rather than by individual efforts, and
hence the result is the strengthening of union power. Gardner and
Moore, in their book, "Human Relations in Industry," noted this effect
when the ambitions of an employee to progress were blocked by imper-
sonal tests and rigid rules.
3 The adverse effect of the railroad type of seniority system was exhaustively treated
in four articles published at the University of Chicago. Mater, Seniority Rights Before
the Courts, 12 Journal of Business 152 (1939); Mater, The Development and Oper-
ation of the Railroad Seniority System, 13, 14 Journal of Business 387, 36 (i4o and
3941); Mater, A Statistical Study of the Effect of Seniority Upon Employee Effi-
ciency, 14 Journal of Business 169 (1941); and Mater, Effects of Seniority Upon the
Welfare of the Employee, Employer, and Society, 14 Journal of Business 384 (194).
4 Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations 38 (1947).
5 Sayles, Seniority: An Internal Union Problem, 3o Harvard Business Review 5S
(,952).
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The mobile group, with their great desire to get ahead, generally have high
expectations. They visualize themselves as achieving important positions in the
company-as becoming part of management. With these feelings, they tend to
have a strong identification with management, rather than with the workers....
So long as these people feel that they are making satisfactory progress toward
their goals, this attitude, this acceptance of management's point of view, is rein-
forced. When, however, they feel that their progress is blocked and they cannot
obtain the status they are seeking, they tend to turn against management. In
these cases they express great dissatisfaction with the company; they become
critical of its policies and suspicious of all its motives. If they are shop workers,
they often turn to the union and become active in it, or perhaps are active in
organizing a union .... 6
Companies which have non-rigid systems which recognize relative
ability generally recognize that an employee's length of service should
be the determining factor in making the choice from among a group
of candidates who have relatively equal ability and physical fitness for
the job in question. The use of the length of service factor at this point
in the selection process rewards a well qualified employee for his loyal-
ty to the job and his years of service to the company but does not injure
efficiency nor thwart the opportunities of superior employees.
These companies believe that the major concepts in the system of
choice presently used within their industries permit the industry to
continue to increase its productivity, minimize industrial accidents,
utilize to the fullest extent handicapped workers, and give to individuals
the maximum of personal satisfaction.
The considerations which are involved in the removal of the relative
ability test and the substitution therefor of length of service as the sole
criterion of choice are noted below. Normally, where the demand for
the removal of the relative ability test is made, a further demand is
made for a required trial period for the employee with the greatest
service and for a shift in the burden of proving the inability of the
employee to meet the minimum requirements of the job from the em-
ployee, represented by the union, to the management. These changes
are designed to enforce the change in the basic test. Since the forced
trial period and change in the burden of proof are means of enforcing
the change in the basic test, these three matters will be considered
together.
The elimination of the relative ability and physical fitness factors
from the seniority test raises certain fundamental problems which
should be considered first.
The maximum utilization of skills and abilities requires that em-
6 Gardner and Moore, Human Relations in Industry (rev. ed., 1950).
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ployees and their jobs should be properly matcbed.-People are not
alike by nature, training, education or inclination. A job may be a
source of great personal satisfaction to one, a monotonous and boring
one to another, and entirely beyond the capacity of a third. Modern
industrial personnel placement strives to place every individual on a job
that matches his capacity. If the job is too difficult, low production and
possible injury either to the operator, a fellow employee, or the ma-
chine may result. If the job is too easy, the result is boredom and dis-
satisfaction.
Just as men differ in their capabilities and skills, so do jobs in industry
vary in their requirements. Some jobs require a tall man; others can be
done equally well or perhaps even better by a short man. Some jobs
require physical strength; others do not demand much physical effort.
Some jobs require keen vision at specific distances; others are relatively
independent of visual skills. Some require educational training; 7 others
require little or no educational background. The different capabilities
and abilities required by, different jobs are not confined only to the
skilled jobs. Joseph Tiffin made this comment:
Industry has long recognized the existence and importance of individual dif-
ferences ... but often employers do not so clearly recognize the fact that differ-
ences in capacity for machine operation and other jobs that are ordinarily con-
sidered as unskilled or semiskilled, are just as great and just as important as dif-
ferences in skill among tradesmen .... The concept of individual differences is
concerned in basic differences in capacity which are of importance in every
phase of industrial personnel placement.8
Unions advocate that the test to be used to match an employee to his
job shall be his length of service. If all jobs required the same abilities
and capacities and all employees had the same abilities and capacities,
this test would have some merit on the basis of the principle of "first
come, first served." But since this is not true, it cannot be used without
causing misfits and inefficiency. All students of this subject agree that
the length of service test produces gross inaccuracies and that ability
evaluations of both men and jobs must be made for proper placement.!
7Educational requirements of job and the educational background of the employees
otherwise eligible for promotion is a valid test when determining relative ability.
National Tube Company & USWA-Local 1104, No. 382; Carnegie-Ilinois Steel Co.
and USWA-Local 1288, No. A-46-Z.8 Tiffin, Industrial Psychology 3 (2d ed, 1947).
9 Taylor, Management's Stake in Collective Bargaining, 81 American Management
Association Personnel Series 18 (x944); Mater, Effects of Seniority Upon the Wel-
fare of the Employee, the Employer and Society, 14 Journal of Business 384 to 418(Univ. of Chicago, 1941); Tiffin, Industrial Psychology (zd ed., 1947); Yoder, Person-
nel Management and Industrial Relations 462 to 464 0942); Harbison, Seniority Sys-
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For example, Dan H. Mater said:
Improvement in nearly every field of endeavor has occurred; is it not, indeed,
time to institute a more scientific way of determining who can work and at
what job? ... any improvement in the seniority system can come only as a
movement away from it.10
When Mater refers to a "seniority system," he is referring to the
railroad system, which he studied exhaustively, where length of service
is the primary test.
If there were correlation between length of service and increased
capacity for different jobs, the inaccuracies which would result from
a use of the length of service test might be somewhat minimized."
However, there has been found to be little or no correlation.'2 The
performance of employees on a particular job has no relationship to the
length of service on even that job. 13 The training on one job has been
found not to be transferable to another except where elements of the
work of the new job are the same. 4
tems-Some Danger Points, 4th Annual Stanford Industrial Relations Conference 1o2(1941) "There is then little justification for the conclusion that, because rigid seniority
rules have persisted on the railroads, they must necessarily become a permanent insti-
tution in the mass production industries. Greater flexibility of seniority rules in manu-
facturing industries is both desirable and, I earnestly hope possible of achievement."
Hancock, Why Workers Feel Insecure, 28 Personnel Journal i77 (1949); Reynolds,
Labor Economics and Labor Relations 2z2 (949); Gardner and Moore, Human Re-
lations in Industry 217 to 284 (rev. ed., 1950); Benjamin M. and Sylvia K. Selelkman,
Productivity and Labor Relations, 27 Harvard Business Review 373 to 391 ('949).
10 Mater, Effects of Seniority Upon the Welfare of the Employee, the Employer and
Society, 14 Journal of Business 384 to 418 (Univ. of Chicago, 1941).
11 Length of experience in a job or doing a particular kind of work is not by itself
proof or even an indication of greater ability. Geneva Steel Company and USWA-
Local z7o; Case No. G-iz, July z, 1949.
12 Tiffin, Industrial Psychology 8 to 17 (2d ed., 1947) summarizes many such studies.
13 One such study by Slocombe revealed a correlation of +.oz3 between experience
on the job and general knowledge of the job. Personnel Research Federation, New
York; 19 Personnel Journal 1zo, 149. Difference in productivity as measured by differ-
ence in incentive eqrnings held to be a proper measure of relative ability between men.
Worth Steel Company and USWA-Local 3182, June 9, 1949.
14 Perrin, An Experimental Study of Motor Ability, 4 Journal of Experimental
Psychology 24 to 56 (1921); Muscio, Motor Capacity with Special Reference to Vo-
cational Guidance, 8 British Journal of Psychology 157 to x84 (1922); Seashore, Stan-
ford Motor Skills Unit, 39 Psychological Monographs 51 to 66 (1928); and Individual
Differences in Motor Skills, 3 Journal of General Psychology 38 to 66 (1930). In fillingjob as roller on temper mill, company was justified in promoting the most qualified
roller on the reduction mill rather than being required to promote an employee with
extensive experience as a feeder on the temper mill because the roller training on
the reduction mill was transferable but the experience as a feeder on the temper mill
was not, Granite City Steel Co. and USWA-Dec. 20, 1948.
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Tests of employees working on repetitive routine jobs sometimes
reveal negative correlations between the employee's mental ability
and his manual dexterities which produce productivity on that job.15
Generally, as jobs ascend in their value, the mental requirements in-
crease, and the manual dexterity requirements normally decrease.
Where employees work on group incentives the employees in the
group themselves are quick to block the transfer of an employee into
the group that they recognize as slow and inefficient. These situations,
where fellow employees would suffer if the relative ability test was
removed do not come to arbitration because in such cases the majority
desire operates against the inefficient employee.
Joseph Tiffin has cited many examples to support his contention that
proper matching of employees to their jobs is important to obtain the
maximum utilization of employees' abilities and capacities, and he said:
On many jobs a good employee is at least twice as valuable to the company for
which he works as a poor employee. We may answer the question about the
magnitude of individual differences, then, by saying that the differences are not
only reaOfit are large enough to be of vital practical importance to industry.16
The exclusive use of the length of service test in the layoff situation
could even cause greater inefficiency because it would require the dis-
placement of men who have received training on their jobs for months
and years. The serious loss of efficiency is true even on those jobs which
are often considered unskilled. 17 For example, several stockmen in a
warehouse may have learned locations of material over a period of
months or years which permit them to perform their work efficiently.
To force their replacement by employees who have not been trained in
this work even though they had potential ability to learn the work,
would require a long period of inefficient operations before the ware-
house would again be operating properly.
The length of service test would produce improper utilization
and an increased risk of damage to equipment.-The technological im-
provement in industry generally and in the steel industry in particular
in recent years has been rapid. More complicated and expensive ma-
chinery and equipment such as high-speed precision rolling mills, and
continuous electroplating processes controlled by complicated devices
15Tiffin, Industrial Psychology 96, 97 (2d ed., 1947).
16 Tiffin, Industrial Psychology 17 (2d ed., 1947). See also Halsey, Handbook of
Personnel Management (1947), and 2o Personnel Journal 166 (3942).
17Halsey, Handbook of Personnel Management (1947); 2o Personnel Journal 166
(1942).
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are being installed. The men who must operate this equipment are
often technical specialists who do not fit the layman's conception that
steel men are merely men of brawn. As one of the presidents of a
steel company said recently:
You know, when a man is handling a machine that may cost $iooooooo or
more ... when he is rolling steel coils at speeds ranging up to 8o miles an hour,
and is controlling the thickness accurately to a tolerance of x/xoooth of an inch
. .. and when he knows that his own safety and the safety of his fellow workers
depends on what he does... it gives him a sense of pride and proper responsi-
bility.'8
Such a man is a trained specialist, and to force his replacement on
the basis of mere length of service alone would be sheer folly.
If employees were transferred to jobs where they control the opera-
tion of such equipment or any part thereof merely on the basis of length
of service alone, there exists a risk of poor utilization, damage to prod-
uct or even damage to this equipment.
As we will show later, the forced trial period will accentuate under-
utilization, potential damage, and the resulting waste.
The use of length of service as the test reduces employee effort;
the relative ability test stimulates performance.-Under the typical
plan proposed by unions, the employee by merely waiting will move to
the higher paid job. This tends to establish the minimum level of per-
formance as the norm.'9 Williamson and Harris,20 in a study conducted
for the 2oth Century Fund, stated with respect to the use of length of
service as the test: "It discourages ability and efficiency and en-
courages the chair-warmer."
On the other hand, where employees have an opportunity to move
up on the basis of their improvement and demonstration of ability, the
most powerful incentive for improved performance results. Harold
A. Wren of Loyola University, Chicago, expresses this fundamental
human motivation in these words:
It would seem from the investigation that an individual is motivated toward a
vocational goal not only by his previous achievement (vocational status level),
and the pressures of his immediate social environment (familial occupations),
but also to exercise those capabilities that he believes he possesses, and to secure
18 Fairless, The Boy Next Door i1 (195).
19 "Ability to perform the work" without regard to any comparison as to whether
this ability is relatively equal between two employees would become the standard of
work performance if length of service governed promotions. Jones and Laughlin Steel
Corp. and USWA, Docket 9 3-C-47-J&L No. 6-158, Union No. 55 7-z3-49; Mitchem,
Seniority Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 293, Z98,
299 (949).
20 Williamson and Harris, Trends in Collective Bargaining ioz (1945).
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the rewards that will accrue to him when the new goal has been achieved. These
rewards, whether power, prestige, income or any other value important to the
worker, are an ever shining goal that sustains ambition throughout life.21
In the final analysis, the workers themselves would be the real losers
if promotions and job security were to be determined primarily on
length of service.
It is sometimes argued that the ability factor should receive greater
weight for the purpose of determining promotions than it is given for
the purpose of determining layoffs. 22
In view of the necessity to maximize the incentives for individual
performance, particularly in the steel industry, the tests in both situa-
tions should be the same. Sumner Slichter points this out when he says:
The application of seniority to lay-offs inevitably weakens the incentives to
efficiency, because superior efficiency is no longer necessarily a protection
against lay-off.2
8
Where the tests for promotions and layoffs are not the same, it has
been found that employees desirous only of holding a job will reduce
their performance to a minimum level.2 4
Any compromise in the way in which the relative ability test
operates so as to make the selection test the mere ability to perform a
job would be destructive to this needed incentive. Unless the test is
relative so that the superior individuals can move ahead, the competi-
tion between individuals to improve themselves in their performance
will not exist. Sumner Slichter made the following comment on exam-
ining this problem from the point of view of the consumer:
Each member of the community in his capacity of consumer has a strong
interest that promotions be by merit. Furthermore, every consumer has an in-
terest that industry be kept dynamic and creative by keeping the door of oppor-
tunity open to superior ability wherever it may be found.25
Blocking advancement with a length of service test causes em-
ployee discontent, turn-over and a reduction in the quality work
force.-The desire of individuals to improve their economic status for
themselves and their families is a normal goal. All individual incentive
21 2o Personnel Journal 317 (194z).
2 2 Employee with four years' experience as Operator-Hot Form and Upset Job,
would have been displaced by a longer-service employee who had never performed thejob had the union prevailed on length of service. American Steel & Wire Co. and
USWA, Local 1885, Grievance No. WS-868.
2 3 Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management 50 (1941).
24 Feldman, Stabilizing Jobs and Wages (94o).
25 Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations 35 (1947).
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is based upon this fact. When the right of individuals to progress on the
basis of their own individual ability and talents is denied them, a frustra-
tion occurs which is manifested in employee discontent, negative atti-
tude, instability and even labor strife.2 6 The famous Hawthorne
studies27 and the studies of Bakke2s and Mayo29 have completely dem-
onstrated this fact.
Furthermore, the inability of the ambitious and able employee to ad-
vance on the basis of his own merit will cause him to seek employment
elsewhere. 30 Turn-over resulting from employees' unwillingness to
wait for the mere passage of time is commented upon by Dale Yoder:
Close adherence to seniority (continuous service) as a basis for advancement
may cause ambitious young workers to seek employment elsewhere, rather than
to make progress by the slow stages which seniority makes necessary. 31
If the typical union proposal was adopted, employment would first
occur in the lowest skilled jobs and the pool of employees with abilities
and capacities for upgrading to higher skilled jobs would therefore be-
LO Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations 222, 223 (1949): "If capable
young men find their promotion blocked by the number of older men above them, and
if they find that the effort they exert has no relation to their occupational progress,
there may be serious effects on efficiency and initiative. It is important, therefore, that
some leeway be left for rapid advancement of unusually capable workers."
George W. Hancock of The University of Illinois, made an exhaustive study of the
causes of insecurity and resentments among workers. He explains that this study was
made because: "The forces of insecurity and resentment on the job are the bases for
much of the turmoil within a shop. If these feelings can be removed or reduced, many
of the surface causes of departmental strife, work stoppage, quits, and strikes will lose
their potency."
To determine the main causes for such insecurity and resentment, he arranged a series
of 22 statements, each statement presumably being a cause of such feeling. Item No. 17,
which was: "Not being permitted advancement, when you have ability, just because
others have been on the Job longer than you have"-was found to be the second most
important cause of insecurity and resentment among workers. z8 Personnel Journal
(Oct., 1949).
Dr. Herbert Moore of Toronto, in his article entided, Basic Needs of Industrial
Workers, states that: "Among the more basic needs of man is one that can be expressed
as an urge to handle the type of a job that will challenge one's own special abilities."
He continues: "A considerable number of dissatisfactions have their roots in the fact
that the men who are holding down jobs are superior to the job, which shows itself in a
number of ways, especially in: ) a careless attitude . . . ; 2) complaints about super-
vision . . . ; 3) the habit of getting into sidelines and diversions . . .; 4) instability."
27 Personnel Journal 344 (1949).
27 Roethlisberger and Dickson, Management and the Worker 255 to 269 (1939).
2s Bakke & Kerr, Unions, Management and the Public (948).
29 Mayo, The Social Problems of the Industrial Civilization (1943).
30 Miller, Why Employees Leave; Company Records and Analysis of Causes of Exits
298 to 305 (1926).
31 Yoder, Personnel Management and Industrial Relations 463 (1942).
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come smaller, and over a period of time, this would expose industry
to a serious disadvantage. This disadvantage, with its resulting decrease
in the quality of the work force, has already occurred in the railroads. 2
In addition to the scarcity of men of capacity and ability which
occurs when length of service alone is the basis of advancement, it has
been found that employees will leave jobs when they have been
assigned to work which is above their capacities. Pond and Bills found
that labor turnover can be markedly reduced by the proper placement
of employees in the jobs commensurate with their ability.3
Problems in employee dissatisfaction will likewise arise if length of
service is the only test used in the lay-off situation. Even labor organi-
zations have been forced to recognize this fact. During the war, pro-
duction machinists were moved into the tool rooms in Detroit. The
regular tool room machinists trained these production machinists in
tool room techniques. When the work force was reduced after the war,
the seniority provisions of the agreement operated to retain the "stu-
dents" in the tool room and to demote the "teachers." This result was
considered unfair by the demoted machinists who believed themselves
entitled to the status they had achieved on the basis of their individual
skill irrespective of their length of service, and this discontent caused
the UAW to propose revisions in the seniority programs to protect the
"skilled employee" from "bumping" by longer service employees.34
The use of length of sersice tests blocks the entrance of trained
personnel, makes impossible a proper integration between industry
and education, and increases the number of supervisors.-Some indi-
viduals, in their desire for personal advancement, continue their educa-
tion through high school and then on to trade schools or college. It is
their intention that by so doing, they will be able to reach a status higher
than those who did not pursue this route of progress and entered indus-
try at an earlier date without the same training. Where all progress
within an industrial organization is controlled exclusively by the length
of service, this individual must enter in a low skilled job or not at all. 35
32 I8 Personnel Journal 177.
33Pond and Bills, Two Studies of Relation Test Score to Job Held, i, Personnel
Journal 41 to 56 (1933).
34 International Union United Automobile Aircraft and Agricultural Workers of
America. Skilled Trades Department Booklet.
35 Harbison, The Seniority Principle in Union-Management Relations 34 (1939):
"Although employers and unionists seemed to be primarily preoccupied with seniority
problems as they directly affect union-management relations, both groups were aware
of the consequences of widespread acceptance of seniority on industry and the working
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It was pointed out earlier that the employee of ambition and ability
will often leave a company if his rate of progress is arbitrarily slowed
down by length of service tests. How can industry integrate the indi-
viduals who continue their education at a level commensurate with
their previous training ?38
Where seniority is controlled by length of service, some labor agree-
ments have established a special class of industrial trainees to provide
opportunities for men to work in preparation for supervisory jobs.
Such special categories are not the answer. American industry should
not be forced to create "loopholes" to integrate itself with the educa-
tional process.
As high as 75 per cent of the supervisors in some steel plants today
have come from "the ranks." This upgrading to supervision is wise for
various reasons-the supervisor knows the work and the working man
and it is psychologically sound to create this additional opportunity
for advancement. If the number of potential supervisors in the ranks
drops because of the effects of the length of service tests, this ratio will
go down and more supervisors will have to be trained and introduced
over the heads of the workers. This causes difficulties among the em-
ployees as Gardner and Moore noted:
As more and more of the higher level positions are filled with college-trained
persons and the workers on the lower levels see themselves further and further
cut off from opportunity, they feel with an increasing intensity the frustration
of living in a 'land of opportunity' where there is no opportunity to be had. 7
Under the length of service system, the inability to integrate men
to jobs where some education is important means that the responsibili-
ties for even the simplest calculations and judgments will more rapidly
be transferred to supervisors. This will cause the number of super-
visors to increase, and added cost will result.
These considerations have implications to the entire educational sys-
tem; as young people learn that additional education means nothing,
population as a whole. "First is the problem of the younger employees and those poten-
tial workers who are just coming out of school. Employers pointed out that, with
greater emphasis on seniority, these younger workers will find it increasingly difficult
to find employment because older workers will have prior claim to existing jobs.
Furthermore, incentive of younger workers may be dampened if they must wait their
turn for advancment regardless of merit and bear the brunt of repeated lay-offs . . "
30 Company upheld in filling job of Junior Cost Analyst with an employee not a
member of the bargaining unit nor of the seniority unit which included this job, as
there was no one in the unit qualified for the vacancy. American Steel & Wire Co. and
USIVA-Local 2353 Grievance No. WK-C-31.
87 Gardner & Moore, Human Relations in Industry 234 (rev. ed., 1950).
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and their date of entrance into employment means everything, they
are under a positive incentive to leave school and go to work too soon.
The use of length of service would increase industrial accidents
and deny employment to handicapped workers.-There have been
tremendous improvements in plant safety records; for example, the
steel industry, through constant vigilance and modem techniques, is
now one of the safest of industries.&3 One of the most important is the
proper placement of employees on jobs. This is well summarized in a
report of the President's Conference on Industrial Safety.
Another method of reducing the number of accidents in industry relates to
the effective integration of the worker and his job by means of (a) determining
what is required of the employee on the job, i.e., job analysis, (b) the testing of
general ability, special aptitudes, and the degree of proficiency or training, and
(c) a study of the worker's physical characteristics, especially in relation to
physical defects or limitations.39
An examination of the critical features of a job usually reveals that
some of the components are closely related to safety. For example, a
plant tractor operator is required to move his tractor through narrow
passageways and around sharp corners. This requirement demands that
the operator must be able to estimate distances accurately and must
have good eye-hand-foot coordination. In this case, a fair degree of
coordination must be present so that the operator can transport mate-
rials quickly. Mere speed, however, is not sufficient. Damage to stored
materials along the way, damage to goods being transported, damage to
vehicle and operator, to the building, and to other personnel are all to
be avoided. Tests for coordination and such other abilities as may be
revealed by an analysis of the job will place men on jobs who have the
necessary behavioral equipment to operate safely as well as quickly. °
To illustrate how rapidly knowledge on the subject of accident pre-
vention through employment placement is developing, we need only
cite the recent article by Dr. Hedwig S. Kuhn in the Journal of Indus-
trial Medicine and Surgery,41 who reported that nearsighted employees
are particularly susceptible to the injury of "detached retina" when
placed on jobs that require heavy lifting.
a8 The Safety record of the Steel Industry was ahead of "Automobiles" and "all
industry." The industry ranking in 195o was: Steel Industry 4.63 man hours lost due to
accident per million man hours worked. Automobiles 4.78 man hours per million man
hours worked. All industry 9.30 man hours per million man hours worked. 19so-
National Safety Council Accident Facts.
39Bulletin No. 12, U. S. Department of Labor.
40Safety Subjects Bulletin No. 67, United States Department of Labor itS.
41 Kuhn, Journal of Industrial Medicine and Surgery (Oct., 195 ).
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Approximately io% of all workers have physical difficulties which
can be classed as partial disabilities.4 2 This physically limited group
must be used in the steel industry, as well as in industry generally, if
our maximum output is to be attained. The maximum utilization of this
group must be accomplished, however, with the minimum of risk to the
individual and to others. If a seniority system forced the company to
transfer employees on length of service alone, disregarding an em-
ployee's physical abilities, the extent of injury to this group of em-
ployees would undoubtedly increase. In addition, since management is
responsible for plant safety, unless it may fit properly these employees
to jobs in industry to the greatest degree possible, they will be denied
employment. Under some union proposals a disabled employee would
have a right to exercise seniority and down-grade himself to vacant
jobs. This means that the judgment concerning an employee's physical
ability to perform a job should be transferred from the management
to the individual worker. This is no answer. The management is legally
and morally responsible for plant safety. It is axiomatic that the right
of determination must rest with the party who has the responsibility. 43
A forced trial period ,would magnify all the adverse effects of
the length of service test.-Under many union proposals the senior
employee must be given a trial period on any job the transfer to which
involves an application of "seniority rights." This trial period require-
ment supplements and enforces union proposals that length of service
should be the sole test for the initial choice. Even if the senior employee
is obviously unqualified, either in terms of his capabilities or physical
abilities, he must be given a trial and training period.
Therefore, the trial period becomes a period during which an un-
qualified employee must be permitted to remain on a job. 4 In many in-
stances another employee would have to be assigned to the job during
42 President's Conference on Industrial Safety, Bulletin i12, United States Depart-
ment of Labor 287 (1940).
43 Company held to have right and duty under its prerogative clause to consider the
health and welfare of its employees in the assignment of duties and was upheld in mov-
ing an employee from job of wire drawer to sweeper-laborer when medical evidence
indicated that requirements of job were too great for employee's physical condition.
John A. Roebling's Sons Co. and USWA-Local 2110, Case No. L-4 3o4 -PHI-L2 79-48.
44 "Of greater consequence is the annoyance, inconvenience, and inefficiency in-
volved in transferring employees from job to job and department to department until
they can be placed on work for which they have sufficient qualification. Carried to
extremes, this 'trial and error' method used in effecting layoffs may disorganize the
whole plant." Harbison, Seniority Policies and Procedures as Developed Through Col-
lective bargaining. Princeton: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University 24
(194).
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this so-called training period. There is usually no way of determining
from a union's proposal the length of this trial period and training. It
could be of substantial duration.4 Any forced trial period on all jobs of
any duration, however, would be dangerous, expensive and otherwise
disruptive to sound industrial relations techniques.
This demand for a trial period has been urged before by various
unions and has been considered by experts. One such expert, Allen P.
Mitchem, has this to say about this demand:
It has frequently been urged by unions, in behalf of the claims of senior em-
ployees who have been by-passed in promotions, that the senior employee is en-
titled to a trial period on the vacant job. It is undoubtedly true that an employee
who has been promoted would, under most contracts, be held entitled to a
reasonable trial period in which to make good at the new job before he may be
demoted. A different situation is presented, however, where the employee who is
seeking promotion asserts that he is entitled to a trial period on the higher job
in order to prove his eligibility for promotion to that job. Since it would be
absurd in most instances to permit all applicants for the promotion to have a
trial period, the issue here will be narrowed to whether the senior applicant
is entitled to a trial period to prove his ability. Supposedly, the only functions
of such a trial period would be to furnish a basis either for determining whether
the senior applicant was 'capable' of handling the job, or for making a com-
parison of the relative abilities of that applicant and of a junior employee who
was aspiring for the position. If there is available other competent evidence
from which the employee's qualifications can be determined (and such evi-
dence probably will be available in most instances), there would seem to be
no justification for permitting the senior employee a trial period in the higher
position .... 46
The introduction of more complicated equipment makes the trial
period that much more serious.
If the management cannot make the initial selection of the most
qualified employee, even though the seniority test contained a gesture
45 Union demand that senior employee be given ample time to learn power house
engineer's job and that an employee be assigned to teach him that job was denied.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., USWA-Local 1462.
Senior employee's claim for job of mill provider denied. A trial period on job in
question would have entailed experience on another job before being able to perform
job of mill provider. American Steel & Wire Co. and USWA-Local 3391, Grievance
No. Dul-CL-8.
Arbitrator gave weight to opinion of company's supervision when denying claim of
senior employee for job as roll polisher. Evidence indicated that it would take a man
with a good machinist's background five or six weeks to become a roll grinder and
after that three or four months to become a roll polisher or a total of four to five
months. American Steel & Wire Co. and USWA-Local 1885, Grievance No. WS-833.
The joint job evaluation manual establishes training periods for as long as six years
and the Union may contend that these training perods are a reasonable trial period.
46 Mitchem, Seniority Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 21 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 311 (1949).
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toward the ability factor, and any form of trial period was required,
the system would operate essentially as a straight length of service sys-
tem with all of the adverse consequences which have been discussed
heretofore.
Trial periods are urged by unions, even where some recognition of
the ability factor is incorporated into the seniority test, because they
claim that the determination of management would otherwise be tinged
with prejudice, friendship for one employee or dislike for another.4
This claim is exaggerated. Supervisors who are working with the em-
ployees soon come to know the capabilities and the physical difficulties
of the employees. '8 Supervisors today are under compelling pressures
to handle the question of employee selection as fairly as they possibly
can.
In certain management-union relationships today, the principle of
selection of employees through tests and aptitude evaluations has been
accepted and is operating successfully.49 Tests are used in the steel in-
47 "On the other hand, it can be argued that although favoritism is undesirable since
it often penalizes the more efficient man, seniority is no solution to the problem. It too
penalizes the good worker-probably on a larger scale. The man with the longest serv-
ice record is not necessarily the most productive worker, and giving the 'breaks' to
him may result in an uneconomical utilization of labor. This argument undoubtedly
points to one of the greatest weaknesses of the seniority principle." Dankert, Contem-
porary Unionism in the United States 374 (1948).
48 "Once the man has been hired and reports for work, his performance including
practices affecting his own safety and that of other workers becomes the responsibility
of his supervisor. Seeing the man in actual performance and in contact with his fellow
workers, the supervisor is in a good position to properly evaluate abilities and traits of
character." Safety Subjects, United States Department of Labor Bulletin 115.
49 The Northwest Airlines have developed a complete program with the Airline
Mechanics Assn. Inc., for grading employees in their maintenance shops.
Frederick Rand Rogers of Boston University has advocated the use of tests of
muscle power in the selection and assignment of employees. He explains that these
strength tests include the measurement of lung capacity, grip strength, back and leg
muscle strength, and strength of upper arm and shoulder girdle muscles. The scores of
each individual are totalled, giving his strength index. Averages or norms have been
scientifically determined for all combinations of sex, weight and age of workers, and
by using these norms and dividing the strength index by the norm for the sex, age and
weight of the individual, a quotient called the "Physical Fimess Index" is calculated.
The P. F. I.'s of individuals range from as low as 30 to 40 for those in poor physical
condition, and P. F. I.'s approaching zoo for those in extremely fine condition. The
author reports that these tests have been scientifically validated, and have been tested
over a 12-year period. He states: "In fact, the number of tests given must now exceed
a million. The reliability co-efficient of the battery is between .97 and .99. The use of
mechanical measuring instruments and standard testing technique, render the tests
highly objective. A large number of schools and universities now use them, particular-
ly in New York State." 15 Personnel Journal z6 (1936).
Harbison reports successful qualifying examinations used for promotion in a coke
plant: This plan was fully accepted by the Union. Seniority Policies and Procedures
42 (194).
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dustry for noncraft jobs.50 They are designed to test physical fitness as
well as capability and cover such qualities as mechanical aptitude, dex-
terity, manual and visual skills."
In addition, many companies have developed employee aptitude rat-
ing procedures to assist their supervisors.52 The State and Federal Gov-
ernments have found such techniques and tools advisable.5" These
systems have been designed to produce a high degree of accuracy and
objectivity. Intensive studies on so-called "halo" tendencies and on the
weighting of the factors evaluated have been made. One of the recent
techniques was developed by the Army, and is known as the "Forced
Choice Method." The studies upon which this new method was based
were initiated when it was recognized that the length of service basis
for promotions was injuring that organization.5 4 It is through the use of
these techniques based upon a wealth of technical study that the proper
solution to the question of employee selection for job transfers must
come.
Men in academic life have devoted their energies to the development
of techniques for the measurement of employee aptitudes and abilities.5 5
5o Tests were given to 150 tinplate inspectors in a steel mill. These tests showed no
significant relationship between the ability of this group to identify defective sheets
and experience on the job. It did show a relationship between ability to identify defec-
tive sheets and scores made on a battery of tests. Tiffin, Industrial Psychology 305 (zd
ed., 1947).
51 Ibid.
52 The General Motors Corporation is working to validate some new techniques of
employee testing and ability at its Delco-Remy plant in Anderson, Indiana, under the
direction of Mr. Bryon Stewart, working in conjunction with Professor Flanagan of
the American Institute of Research in Pittsburgh.
One such system in a steel company was carefully validated by Tiffin and was de-
scribed in American Management Association Personnel Series No. 127 (1949).
53 The men who are responsible for the personnel policies of Government agencies
advocate and use merit rating to determine the performance and progress of the em-
ployees. For example, Irving Weinstock of the New York State Employment Service
specialized in formulating merit rating programs for the War Manpower Commission
during World War II, as well as for his employer, the State of New York. 27 Personnel
Journal 223 (948).
"Almost all rating systems include some measure of subjectivity, but since we are
dealing with human beings, not machines, this is necessarily and properly so." Wein-
stock, 27 Personnel Journal 224 0948).
54 Sisson, Forced Choice-The New Army Rating, i Personnel Psychology 365 to
381 (948).
For the use of merit rating by the Army and Navy, see Leatherman, Army Person-
nel Research, Public Personnel Review 1 13 to 1zz (July, 1948).
55John C. Flanagan of the American Institute for Research in A Report of Three
Years of Experience (Sept., 195o), shows that the total studies by himself and his staff
will not be completed for zo years.
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If the elimination of the relative ability and physical fitness factors in
the seniority systems became the prevalent practice due to Government
recommendation, or otherwise, and forced trial periods were intro-
duced to implement this test, the efforts of these men could be almost
futile because such compromises would spread throughout industry.
Shifting the burden of proving inefficiency would be inconsistent
witb the established concepts of management's function.-The indi-
viduals who comprise the management carry the responsibility for
planning the work and directing the working forces. These individuals
are under incentives to perform this function in a way that will result
in efficient operations. It is a basic rule that the persons who have the
responsibilities must have the necessary rights to properly discharge
their responsibilities. The right to evaluate the qualifications of em-
ployees for certain jobs and to select the most qualified employee avail-
able for a job are among the most fundamental responsibilities of any
individual who is charged with directing the activities of any group of
people. This principle applies to all organizations including an indus-
trial plant or any subdivision thereof. If this right is denied to the indi-
viduals charged with the responsibility, successful operations would be
seriously impeded.
Since the selection of the most qualified employee for a job is one of
the functions of management, management must be free to initially per-
form this function-of course in conformance with the standards or
tests established in the labor agreement. Sumner Slichter observed:
The determination of merit is a responsibility of management. Merit will ob-
viously differ in various situations. An important aspect of merit is a man's
adaptability to the people with whom he must work. Will he be a good member
of a team? Will he add the proper qualities to the team? Will he improve the
balance of the team? Managers are in the best position to answer these questions.
Indeed, that is what they are hired for. The requirement that promotions be
based on seniority deprives managers of the opportunity to exercise some of
their most important skills. (Emphasis added.) 56
This principle of supplying to management the rights necessary to
perform its function properly is deeply ingrained into the principles
which have thus far been controlling in union-management relations.
The opinions of the War Labor Board and arbitration boards recognize
this "functional approach. 57
50 Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations 37 (1947).
57 For these cases see: Fairweather and Shaw, Minimizing Disputes in Labor Contract
Negotiations, Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1947).
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Pointing out these principles does not mean that a union has no
function to perform in the employee selection process. It performs the
same function at this point that it does at many others. The union's
main concern is to see that management, in initiating the every-day
decisions which it must make, applies the principles established in the
agreement fairly. The entire union steward system operates through a
series of observers (the stewards) who have the function of detecting
and challenging any action by management which is contrary to the
principles of the labor agreement. The union stewards should remain
in the challenging position. It is management that is responsible for
initiating the actions and must remain the "acting party." Since an
employee could not be removed from a job unless the management
could prove to the union that the employee was not performing the
job in a manner at least equal to the minimum standards on that job,
the union's proposal reverses the normal position of the parties-it
puts management in the challenging position.
If such a change in the burden of proof were made and a dispute
went to arbitration, it would require arbitrators either to leave in-
efficient or physically unqualified employees on jobs or make refined
evaluations of employee performance. An arbitrator is not in a position
to determine refined questions of ability or competence. Arbitrators
can only determine whether the initial selection has been exercised in
an arbitrary and unfair manner. This is the view of arbitrators gen-
erally, and informed observers. Slichter states:
Incidentally, disputes over whether A or B is the better man for a job do not
present the kind of question which should be referred to arbitration. That would
merely be asking a neutral, who is not necessarily skilled as a manager and who
cannot begin to master the facts in the case, to substitute his judgment for that of
management-in other words, to replace the judgment of a professional with thejudgment of an amateur. An appropriate question for arbitration, however,
would be the charge that management did not exercise its discretion in good
faith, that it was actuated by ulterior motives. 58
The War Labor Board, whose functions were basically similar to
those currently performed by the Wage Stabilization Board in the
handling of disputes, had before it a number of cases which involved
attempts by labor organizations to eliminate the relative ability and
physical fitness of employees as the primary basis for employee selec-
tion in connection with seniority questions. Such demands by labor
58 Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations 38 (1947).
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organizations were uniformly rejected by the Board.59 The position of
.the Board was well summarized in Douglas Aircraft, Inc., as follows:
It seems to the Industry and Public Members that the Union proposal would
have a tendency to stifle that great American characteristic, the competitive
spirit. The possibilities which are open to young Americans because of merit,
ability, and capacity, developed for the most part by hard work, differentiate
them from the young men of many other nations where merit, ability, and capac-
ity mean little toward advancement. In such countries, young men must get in
line and wait; hence ambition and initiative, traditionally American traits, are
stifled.60
The War Labor Board also received and reviewed demands by labor
organizations for trial periods and, in this issue likewise, the Board uni-
formly denied the union's request. In International Derrick and Equip-
ment Company,61 the National War Labor Board reversed a decision of
the Fifth Regional Board, which had recommended that there be a
thirty-day trial period to determine an employee's ability to perform
a job.
Similarly, in the case of Fada Radio & Electric Company, Inc.,62
Public Members Dexter M. Keezer and Edwin M. Witte of the Na-
tional Board rejected a thirty-day trial period recommendation made
by the Second Regional War Labor Board. The company pointed out
that it would have to go through a trial process in the order of employee
service before finding a person suitable for the higher rated job and
that this was a "staggering proposition."
In Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp.,,3 the union requested that the
seniority clause contain the sentence: "Ability to perform the work
shall be determined by a trial period on the job." The Panel recom-
mended denial of the Union's request, and the Ninth Regional Board
(Denver) sustained this denial.
On the question of whether or not the function of management to
make the initial decisions should be limited, and the burden of proof
transferred from the union to the company, the position of the Board
59 Montgomery Ward & Co., 4 WLR 277 (1942); Texas Co., 7 WLR 411 (1943);
Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 15 WLR 551 (1944); Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 15 WLR
495 (1944); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 19 WLR 423 (1944); American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 2o WLR Zox; "Sufficiency Ability" clauses were requested but not
recommended in Douglas Aircraft, Inc., cited above; General Motors Corp., 22 WLR
233 (1945); General Motors Corp., 22 WLR 484 (945); U. S. Gypsum Co., i8 WLR
68z; Lewis Allis Co., 18 WLR 59 (944); Detroit Steel Products Co., 6 WLR 495
(1943).
60 25 WLR 229 (1044). 62 24 WLR 647 (1945).
61 28 WLR 649 (1945). 624 WLR 452 (1945).
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was likewise uniform. 4 See the case of American Can Company.6"
In Gerber Products Co.,66 the National War Labor Board adopted
the following statement by the Eleventh Regional Board:
The Union demands the abolition of the present merit-rating system. It does
so on the ground that the employees do not know who makes the merit ratings
and never sees these ratings.
The panel deemed this demand of the Union to be unwarranted and the
majority of the Regional Board concurs in the recommendation of the panel.
In merit-rating systems generally the employees do not know who makes the
ratings. While it may be desirable that the employees should know how they
are being rated, this can by no means be considered a right of the employee.
Merit ratings are made primarily for the benefit of the employer. It would be a
serious encroachment upon management rights if its rights to rate employees in
accordance with its own standards were forbidden. We deem such a restriction
to be unwarranted. (Emphasis added.)
In Murray Co.,67 the Eighth Regional Board said, concerning man-
agement's right to make the determination concerning ability:
The decisions concerning ability shall be made by management. The decision
of management, when based on ability rather than seniority, shall be subject to
grievance procedure as set out in this contract, but management's decision as to
ability cannot be set aside by arbitration, except for reasons of favoritism, dis-
crimination or serious mistake.
In Lincoln Mills of Alabama,6" the Fourth Regional Board stated on
this subject the following:
... It is a recognized principle of employer-employee relations that the selec-
tion of men for promotion to positions of higher skill logically belongs in the
realm of management and is a right and responsibility which must devolve upon
those charged with the conduct of business.
The position of tripartite panels established by the Government now
should be no different than they were during the period that the War
Labor Board was functioning. A mere hiatus in time should not be
significant.
SENIORITY SYSTEMS AS SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Seniority provisions are the part of a labor agreement more than any
other which involve human relations in industry. To the extent that
they involve placing the right individual on the right job and his as-
64 For other War Labor Board cases giving management the right to make the pri-
mary determination of ability, see Texas Co., 7 WLR 411 (1943); Reuben H. Donnelly
Corp., z5 WLR 551 (944); Lincoln Mills, 15 WLR 495 (1944); Allis Chalmers Mfg.
Co., i 9 WLR 423 (1944); American Telephone & Telegraph Co., zo "vVLR 2o (1944).
6 13 WLR 644 (1944). 67 25 WLR 217 (1945).
" 12 WLR 74 (1943). us 15 WLR 495 (1944).
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pirations and incentives for future progress, they are of concern to
the employees and to the management alike. The system must be
flexible. Men are not cut from the same mould and Clarence Manion
said concerning this:
There has never been nor will there ever be a time when all men are equal
in their capacities and conditions here on earth. The nature of the individual as
well as the nature and continuity of human society, demands these unfailing
differences. Without the wide diversification of talents, taste, abilities and ambi-
tions that now and always exist among men, Society could neither feed nor
clothe itself. It is consequently a wise provision of Providence that causes the
perpetuation of endless variety in the desires and capabilities of human beings.
Sparked with personal liberty and the natural personal incentive to own prop-
erty and advance economically this conglomeration of inequality synchronizes
into a great engine for the sustenance and progress of mankind.69
The problems under discussion here involve intimately the rights
of individuals to progress and thus raise their economic status through
the process of competing with other individuals. The concept of com-
petition in our society is not limited to competition between com-
panies. Competition was defined by a study group led by Paul G. Hoff-
mann as the "indispensable pillar of the American Society"-"an ex-
pression of the individual's expectancy of realizing his potential...
It is true that modern industry is a complicated process. This does
not mean that these fundamental beliefs should be forgotten-it means
that greater efforts must be made to protect them. David Lilienthal has
said that "there are few who fail to see that modern applied science and
the machine are threats to the developments of the individual personal-
ity, the very purpose of democratic institutions. ' 70
Controlling the progress, the incentives and aspirations of men in
industry by a factor as irrelevant to these basic beliefs, as the date of
their employment, is an arbitrary, unreasonable and destructive re-
striction.
Unions have often charged that managements are cool and imper-
sonal toward workers. They have said that management treats an em-
ployee as a mere number-as a member of a crew identified merely
with a clock number. It is submitted that the proposals of unions to
control the movement of employees through their economic life by a
mere number-that is, the date of their employment, actually shows
that unions rather than managements have the desire to treat individuals
00 Manion, The Key to Peace z7 (1951).
70 Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March, p. 22 (1944).
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impersonally. In fact, any test which blocks individual opportunities
other than the "skills and energies" of the individual, is subject to the
same criticism. Controlling the progress of men in industry by a factor
as irrelevant as the date he enters employment in a plant is an impersonal
standard as it ignores his qualities as an individual.
The entire structure of American economic and social life rests on
two fundamental principles. The first is that all men shall have an equal
legal opportunity to progress. The second fundamental principle is
that, given this equal legal opportunity, a man may progress on the
basis of his own talents, skill, work and ambition. The first of these
principles is equalitarian and the second individualistic. They are com-
plementary-not antagonistic-and through their inter-operation they
have given working men in the United States the greatest incentive for
economic self-betterment that working men have ever had.
The vital importance of these two principles in the American
economy was well stated by Lloyd Warner, anthropologist and so-
ciologist at the University of Chicago, when he said:
Our system must provide for the rise of men and their families from lower to
higher levels, or to say in the jargon of the social scientists, 'vertical social
mobility' must continually function in the lives of men if our system is to be
democratic and successful.... The opportunity for social mobility for every-
one is the very fabric of the American Dream. The American Dream is not a
mere phantasy that can be dismissed as unimportant to those who think realisti-
cally, for it does provide the motivating power for much of what we do in our
daily lives.71
The introduction of the railroad type of seniority has substantially
blocked the occupational route of progress in that industry and as
Warner explains, this "constitutes a grave and fundamental problem
that must be faced by all business and industrial leaders; moreover, if
we are to survive as a social system, it is a problem that our nation
must solve." He said further:
If individuals cannot progress on the basis of their own abilities and talents,
they blame the system and they 'tend not to act as individuals with separate
decisions and separate consciences, but feel themselves to be a group who have
a common grievance against those who run things.'... The consequences of this
change may be disastrous to the proper functioning of a free system.7 2
It is no answer to say a part of freedom is to contract away funda-
mental rights; nor that such action is the will of the majority. As Paul
71 American Management Association Personnel Series, No. 127 (1949).
72 Ibid.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
A. Freund said in a series of lectures entitled "On Understanding the
Supreme Court," the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been
used more and more to protect freedom of individual expression, which
includes the right of individuals to develop themselves.7" This is con-
sistent with the fundamental political, legal and religious background
of our society. Manion said:
While the Europeans were sowing the materialistic winds of their political
and economic storms, our Founding Fathers were building Americanism upon
the firm foundations of religious faith. When the French Revolutionaries were
hammering men into mere matter, the American Revolutionaries were exalting
and safeguarding man's spirit. The European system was moulding men into
'masses' and 'classes' at the same time that the American system was dedicating
itself to the task of preserving the integrity of the 'individual Personality.' 74
Union proposals that length of service alone should be controlling,
and contractual rights should control all transfers, limit and restrict
the freedom of an individual employee to hold his job and progress to
a better job on the basis of his individual effort and ability, and develop
a rigid system with none of the necessary tolerances that exist when
the contractual application is limited to the promotional and layoff situ-
ations, and management's initial judgment is allowed to operate.
Gardner and Moore said that it must be "realized that people cannot
be moved around according to some master plan the way a planning
engineer moves machines. People are affected by the way the move
takes place, by the meaning it has for them, and by their attitudes to-
ward both the old job and the new job .... ,71
Seniority systems should consist of a series of principles which are
highly flexible in their application. Leonard R. Sayles explained that
"the idea that seniority provides a rigid system for allocating jobs, and
that disputes on the subject only arise on the 'seniority v. ability' princi-
ple is not realistic. Seniority is not an exact measuring rod but rather a
highly flexible instrument subject to use by all groups in the pursuance
of their own interests. Those who wish to understand seniority, there-
fore, will not be totally informed after a mere reading of the contract.
They must go out and observe the men in the plant, changing and ad-
justing their relations with each other through the manipulation of
seniority.'"7
73 Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 28 to 38 (1949).
74 Manion, The Key to Peace 29 (1951).
75 Gardner and Moore, Human Relations in Industry 273 (rev. ed., 1950).
70Sayles, Seniority: An Internal Union Problem, 3o Harvard Business Review 55
(1952).
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The principles in effect generally in many industries including the
steel industry should be retained by preserving the ability and physical
fitness factors as the primary test and permitting the flexibility neces-
sary in the operation of such a system by preserving as tolerance fac-
tors certain limitations on contractual applications and allowing man-
agement to exercise its judgment initially when employee selections
are made.
